Dynamic Device Hash Continuity Without CRLs or OCSP

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What Continuity-Based Credential Specifies

Each governed-mesh device maintains a current device hash that derives from its previous device hash through a credentialed signing operation. The signing authority (the credentialing authority that issued the device's initial hash) issues each successor. Revocation occurs by simple non-issuance: when the authority decides to revoke a device, the authority does not issue the next successor hash.

Receiving devices verify continuity by walking the hash chain backward to a trusted root. A device with an unbroken chain back to a credentialed root is admissible; a device whose chain breaks is rejected. Time-bounding ensures the chain reflects current authority: each successor has a validity window, and a device whose current hash has expired must obtain a new successor or fall out of admissibility.

Why CRL/OCSP Architecture Has Been the Weak Point

Conventional certificate-revocation infrastructure (Certificate Revocation Lists, Online Certificate Status Protocol) requires the receiving party to obtain current revocation status from a centralized authority. The architecture has known operational weaknesses: CRLs become large and stale; OCSP requires real-time

queries that fail in disconnected operation; both depend on centralized infrastructure that becomes a single point of failure and a target for adversarial action.

V2X PKI deployments have struggled with these issues for two decades. The Security Credential Management System (SCMS) developed for V2X attempts various workarounds (short-lived pseudonym certificates, butterfly key expansion) that improve specific aspects but do not eliminate the structural CRL/OCSP dependency. The architecture is fundamentally retrieval-based, and retrieval-based revocation does not survive disconnected, expeditionary, or contested operation.

How Continuity Replaces Retrieval

Continuity-based revocation is non-issuance rather than retrieval. The authority makes a decision (issue or don't issue the successor); the receiving party evaluates the resulting chain. There is no separate revocation infrastructure to query, no CRL to download, no OCSP responder to depend on.

The architecture supports operation in disconnected and contested environments natively. A device operating without backhaul connectivity can verify peer credentials by walking received hash chains to credentialed roots that the device has previously cached. Successor-hash distribution flows through the same governed mesh that distributes any other credentialed observation. The architecture is uniform across connected, disconnected, and adversarially-isolated operation.

What This Enables for Real-World Mesh Deployment

V2X deployments gain a revocation architecture that operates correctly in real-world conditions including poor cellular coverage, in-tunnel operation, urban-canyon RF degradation, and adversarial signal denial. The structural CRL/OCSP dependencies that have hampered V2X commercial deployment are removed.

Defense mesh, expeditionary deployment, and critical-infrastructure mesh gain the same advantage. The patent positions the primitive at the structural layer below the per-deployment workarounds that current PKI architectures require to function in challenging operating conditions.