1. Problem and Premise

In ephemeral or cognition-native systems, such as distributed AI agents or stateless substrates, the requirement to maintain static credentials is impractical or infeasible. Public-key infrastructure binds identity to a long-lived keypair that must be stored, protected, and managed through certificate authorities, revocation lists, and online status protocols. Passwords bind identity to a memorized secret that is reused and leaked. Biometric templates bind identity to a body and cannot be rotated once captured. In each case a durable secret exists, and the security of the identity depends on that secret remaining hidden.

The disclosed architecture provides an authentication substrate that operates securely without persistent keys or external verification authorities, and instead derives identity from locally retained, time-sensitive, and context-aware behavioral information. A device or agent expresses identity as a trust slope: the cumulatively validated sequence of Dynamic Agent Hashes (DAHs) or Dynamic Device Hashes (DDHs) formed by successive, verifiable identity mutations, rather than as a static credential. Each identity step is computed from the immediately prior step and a source of non-exported unpredictability, enabling receivers to evaluate continuity and provenance locally, without reliance on centralized authorities, long-lived keypairs, or synchronized registries.

Trust-slope continuity denotes that a presented successor is a valid descendant of a previously trusted state under policy-bounded checks. Because an attacker lacking the device's local state or volatile salt cannot feasibly synthesize valid successors, a captured device does not surrender a reusable key; it surrenders a state that becomes stale as soon as the legitimate device advances. The set of cooperating slopes and their validation rules is referred to in the disclosure as the Dynamic Signature Mesh (DSM).

2. Dynamic Hashes and the Update Rule

At initialization, a slope root is established by computing a dynamic hash from one of two exemplary mechanisms. In the first, a static hardware anchor such as a TPM, TEE, or SoC identifier is combined with a volatile salt to yield an unpredictable seed. In the second, a locally observed state is collected into a local state vector, processed by an extractor to produce a bounded pseudorandom token, and combined with a volatile salt. A semantic context vector and a memory state indicator may be incorporated to bind role, zone, or process mix to the initial identity. The resulting dynamic device or agent hash at epoch zero forms the slope root.

The identity is advanced by an update rule that concatenates the prior hash with a fresh entropy input and a domain-separating tag to yield the next step on the slope. In one example the update is computed as H(DAH_prev ∥ Ext(X) ∥ salt ∥ tag), where X is derived from the local state vector. Alternatively the update is computed as H(DAH_prev ∥ KDF(HWID, salt) ∥ tag) using the hardware anchor and volatile salt. These may be combined in a hybrid derivation. Application of the update yields successive identities along a verifiable, forward-only trust slope.

In the local-state embodiment, the local state vector consists of device-observable signals sampled within an epoch, including one or more of monotonic counters, high-resolution timing deltas, CPU performance counters, scheduler jitter statistics, I/O inter-arrival micro-jitter, sensor noise, rolling process histograms, and short-horizon sketches of recent dynamic hashes. The feature map that produces X applies normalization and clipping, projects to a fixed dimension via signed random projections with a public seed, optionally appends a discrete context code, and applies a locality-sensitive binarization so that small fluctuations produce stable X values while genuine role or zone changes flip a controlled subset of bits. Mutation classes are recorded for each step to preserve semantic provenance.

3. Stateless Symmetric Encryption and Two-Stage Validation

Messages are constructed so that identity is bound at both transport and semantic layers. A sender derives a symmetric encryption key by applying a key-derivation function to the recipient's current dynamic identity, selected from a recipient dynamic agent hash (DAH_R) or recipient dynamic device hash (DDH_R), together with a domain-separating context. The sender performs authenticated encryption over the payload and embeds an additional copy of the sender's current dynamic agent hash (DAH_S) inside the ciphertext. The constructed message contains a transport header carrying the sender's current dynamic hash (DAH_t) and the encrypted payload, and the message does not include the symmetric encryption key.

Upon receipt the recipient performs a two-stage validation procedure. First, the dynamic hash presented in the message header is checked against the last trusted successor stored locally using a lightweight continuity test, to confirm that the incoming header value is a valid successor on the sender's trust slope. If continuity cannot be confirmed immediately, the recipient may defer the decision until a bounded proof or checkpoint is obtained. If continuity is validated, the node derives a decryption key from its own current identity and attempts payload decryption. Successful decryption demonstrates that the payload was generated for the correct memory-resolved identity state of the recipient at the time of transmission.

Following decryption, the recipient extracts the embedded sender dynamic agent hash from the plaintext and validates it as the expected successor on the sender's trust slope under policy-bounded continuity rules. This second-stage check provides semantic authentication independent of the transport header. The message is accepted only upon successful validation of both the header value and the embedded value. If either validation fails, the recipient records a rejection, may degrade the sender's trust score according to local policy, and may quarantine the message or sender for review. Neither sender nor recipient maintains long-lived session keys; all symmetric keys are derived transiently from identity values produced by the update rule.

4. Trust-Slope Continuity Validation

A stored trust slope consists of a sequence of previously validated dynamic identities derived under the update rules. When a new message or agent presents a claimed identity in its transport header, the receiving node determines whether the claim is a valid successor to the most recently trusted value under policy-bounded continuity rules. The node performs a fast continuity comparison by reconstructing the expected successor neighborhood from the last trusted identity and checking whether the presented value lies within the allowed successor set.

In local-state embodiments, continuity constraints are enforced using a stability-tuned acceptance radius over extractor outputs; the node may validate a short distance sketch included with the claim to confirm that the extractor output falls within a policy-acceptable neighborhood without exposing the underlying local state. In hardware-anchor embodiments, continuity constraints are enforced through verification of per-epoch salt freshness and cadence. In hybrid embodiments, both checks are enforced and anomaly in either source suffices to trigger rejection. Claims that satisfy continuity are classified as on-slope and allowed to proceed; those that do not are treated as probable spoofed or forged identities.

Failure outcomes are recorded with explicit reasons, such as continuity violation, sketch or neighborhood mismatch, stale salt, cadence anomaly, or replay detection. Based on policy the node may reject the claim outright, degrade the sender's trust score, or quarantine the sender for later review. If continuity is validated, the node accepts the claim, updates its stored reference, and appends a validation trace to its local memory. Acceptance and rejection decisions follow the trust-slope lineage and local policy and do not require external authentication services.

5. Agent Mutation Entanglement

A host node maintains a current Dynamic Device Hash computed under the update rules. When a semantic agent with a prior Dynamic Agent Hash is admitted to the host's execution context, the host prepares to entangle any mutation initiated by the agent with its current DDH. When the agent initiates a mutation such as a role change, delegation, policy commit, or semantic state transition, the host computes a mutation class indicator and derives a host mutation token bound to the current DDH. The mutation token may be calculated as a hash of the DDH, mutation class, and epoch identifier.

The agent's successor identity is computed as a hash of its prior identity, the host mutation token, an optional agent-side extractor output derived from agent memory and semantic context, a volatile per-epoch agent salt, and a domain-separating tag. The host records an entanglement trace entry containing the prior agent identity, the host's current device identity, the mutation token, the resulting successor identity, and the mutation class, and signs the entry or authenticates it with a MAC derived from the host's DDH. The agent appends the entry to its memory field and updates a cumulative commitment chain by hashing the prior commitment with the new entry, ensuring forward-secure tamper evidence.

A verifier replays the mutation by checking that the successor identity is a valid derivation from the prior identity using the disclosed mutation token and salt, verifying the host's signature or MAC, and confirming that the mutation token opens to a DDH consistent with policy. Because the host's device identity is itself derived from non-exported unpredictability, an attacker lacking the host's device entropy inputs cannot synthesize a valid mutation token or forge an acceptable entanglement entry. Verification fails closed if the signature or MAC is invalid, if the mutation token cannot be reconciled with a valid host DDH, or if the successor is not a valid derivation from the predecessor. Entanglement traces may be authenticated with ephemeral signing keys destroyed upon rotation or with MACs keyed from the host's current DDH, preserving the property that no persistent long-lived keypairs are required.

6. Rotation, Quorum Recovery, and Delayed Validation

A rotation mechanism maintains freshness, forward secrecy, and policy alignment by periodically regenerating an entropy anchor and reinitializing the trust slope. A slope health monitor evaluates staleness indicators such as elapsed-epoch limits, observed drift or cadence anomalies, entropy reuse heuristics, degradation in trust behavior, or compromise signals. When a monitored condition meets policy-defined thresholds, a reseed event generates a new entropy anchor and a new initial identity, computed with the same update rule using a versioned domain separator. A forward link allows verifiers to replay successors along the new slope and confirm that the new epoch opens to the previous one. Certain embodiments allow biometric-assisted reseeding in which a sample is passed through a privacy-preserving fuzzy extractor and used only locally; the seed is never stored or exported in raw form.

A quorum-based recovery mechanism enables an agent to restore its trust slope after memory loss, entropy corruption, or state discontinuity without persistent credentials. When an agent detects that its lineage is missing or invalid, it initializes a reseeded identity and issues a signed attestation request to peers previously encountered during its operational history. Each peer evaluates the request using locally retained evidence such as stored checkpoints, lineage anchors, historical mutation classes, and prior execution context. A peer that finds the request consistent with policy tolerances issues a signed attestation referencing the new identity and citing the most recent trusted anchor it holds. The recovery token serves as a durable pivot point for future validation.

A delayed-validation mechanism supports environments where continuity checks cannot be performed immediately due to latency, intermittent connectivity, or long-duration disconnection. A sender includes its current identity, a transmission timestamp, and a bounded set of mutation proofs that compactly represent trust-slope evolution since a previously trusted anchor. These proofs enable downstream verifiers to reconstruct missing identity steps without persistent connectivity or external registries. Acceptance requires strict monotonic advancement and prohibits reuse of previously accepted successors for a given sender and context. Sparse trust-slope recovery extends this to memory-limited devices, which may retain only a few non-adjacent slope points and a compact checkpoint, and reconstruct missing steps deterministically through a bounded proof window.

7. Resistance to Compromise and Quantum Threats

Resistance to static-key compromise arises from the absence of persistent secrets. Each DAH or DDH is ephemeral, non-reusable, and meaningful only as part of a monotonic sequence anchored in a previously trusted state. Observing a dynamic identity yields no ability to generate successors, because continuity checks require advancing from retained prior state under policy-bounded update rules. Spoofing and impersonation are mitigated by enforcing on-slope continuity and validating entanglement traces: a presenter must produce a valid descendant of the verifier's last trusted state, and for agent mutation steps must provide a host-signed entanglement trace that opens to the device identity active at execution.

Quantum threats are mitigated by avoiding algebraic assumptions vulnerable to Shor's algorithm. Security depends on the min-entropy λ of per-step unpredictability and the preimage resistance of the hash or extractor. As disclosed, offline forgery succeeds with probability roughly 2^(−λ), reduced to 2^(−λ/2) under quantum amplitude-amplification attacks, and extractor outputs and digests sized at 256 to 512 bits provide conservative margins. Because no persistent private key exists, there is no asymmetric key for a future quantum computer to attack.

Side-channel and co-residency risks are constrained through locality and diversification: hardware-anchor embodiments use per-epoch salts to prevent cross-context replay, and local-state embodiments may disclose only short, error-tolerant sketches that are non-invertible. Host compromise and off-substrate mutation attempts are contained through entanglement, since each mutation step requires a host-signed trace whose mutation token must open to the executing host's DDH; absent or incoherent entanglement fails closed. Compromise of a single identity state does not enable durable impersonation, because the compromised state is consumed by the legitimate device's next advance, after which the snapshot is stale.

8. Embodiments and Legacy Interoperability

The disclosed mechanisms operate across heterogeneous substrates, including stateless execution fabrics, intermittently connected networks, memory-constrained devices, decentralized multi-domain systems, and cognition-native platforms, by validating identity strictly as monotonic progression along a trust slope formed from local unpredictability and semantic context. In stateless deployments such as ephemeral workers, serverless functions, relays, and mobile agents with no durable storage, devices derive DAHs and DDHs directly from local inputs, perform header-level continuity screening, derive a symmetric key from the recipient's current identity, and emit bounded validation traces. The architecture is neutral to the unpredictability source: hardware-anchored, local-state, or hybrid.

Predictive mutation verification supplements continuity checking by forecasting expected successor identities and bounding acceptable deviation. A forecasting engine operates over a history buffer of prior validated identities, mutation classes, and inter-step cadence statistics, producing an expected-identity set with acceptance envelopes and timing expectations against which a presented claim is compared. In local-state embodiments the envelope is a Hamming ball around a predicted extractor token sized by observed intra-role variability; in hardware-anchor embodiments it is a forecast of salt freshness and cadence bounds.

Compatibility with legacy PKI-based systems is enabled through a fallback identifier mechanism that preserves strict isolation between memory-native identity evolution and legacy authentication paths. A legacy-bridge adapter generates a temporary keypair and session nonce under a domain-separated context and derives a fallback identifier as a hash of the public key, the nonce, and a context tag, maintained entirely within an isolation boundary. DAH and DDH formation remain unaffected. Any attempt to inject PKI material into DAH or DDH, to export DAH or DDH internals, or to extend a fallback identifier beyond its authorized scope results in closed-fail termination.

9. Disclosure Scope

The mechanisms described here, the trust slope as a cumulatively validated sequence of Dynamic Agent Hashes and Dynamic Device Hashes, the update rule combining a prior hash with non-exported unpredictability and a domain-separating tag, two-stage validation binding a transport-header dynamic hash and an embedded sender hash to memory-resolved identity, agent mutation entanglement through host-derived mutation tokens and signed entanglement traces, entropy-anchor rotation, quorum-based and sparse recovery, delayed validation, predictive mutation verification, and the isolated legacy PKI bridge, are disclosed in U.S. Application No. 19/388,580. This article describes that disclosed subject matter at the level of architectural mechanism and is not a claim of deployment readiness, certification under any regulatory regime, performance guarantee, or universal adversarial resistance.

Specific behaviors, including extractor choice, acceptance radii, salt cadence, attestation tolerances, checkpoint cadence, and reseed thresholds, are parameterized at the policy and trust-relationship level, and the values appropriate to a given deployment depend on the threat model, hardware capabilities, and operational constraints of that deployment. The quantum-resistance characterization is stated in terms of the min-entropy of per-step unpredictability and the preimage resistance of the hash or extractor as set out in the specification, and digest sizes are cited as disclosed rather than as a recommendation for any particular workload. Comparisons to public-key infrastructure, passwords, biometrics, and hardware tokens are presented to clarify structural distinctions, not to assert that the disclosed architecture is appropriate for every workload.