Mechanism
Governance enforcement without persistent keypairs is an optional embodiment of the cryptographically enforced governance architecture. In environments where long-lived private keys are unavailable, undesirable, or insecure, authority is established through verifiable continuity of governance evidence rather than through static credentials. Deterministic precondition gating is preserved: a proposed governed action is permitted only when objectively verifiable records satisfy externally governed policy authority, and otherwise non-execution results as a valid system outcome.
In this embodiment an agent object operates without persistent key storage. It carries governance-relevant memory comprising prior authorization outcomes, denials, governance-designated execution feedback, lineage continuity markers, and audit references. Authority is asserted through the continuity evidence embodied in that memory and its associated records rather than through possession of a private key. When the agent object proposes a governed action, a governance gate initiates evaluation before any execution context is instantiated.
Memory-Resolved Identity Evaluation
The governance gate performs a memory-resolved identity evaluation that determines whether the agent object's memory and its associated continuity records form a coherent, verifiable continuity chain under an applicable trust model. The evaluation may include validation of hash-linked entries, inclusion proofs for audit references, verification of lineage continuity, and comparison against previously observed authority fingerprints. It also detects discontinuities indicative of tampering, fork anomalies, or unauthorized reconstitution.
This evaluation substitutes for the role a static, key-bound identity would otherwise play. Rather than checking a signature against a registered public key, the gate establishes that the present state is a verifiable successor of prior authorized states by inspecting the structural continuity of the records the agent object carries. Where continuity cannot be established or audit references cannot be validated, authorization fails and no execution context is instantiated.
Trust-Slope Validation
In parallel with the memory-resolved identity evaluation, the governance gate performs trust-slope validation. Trust-slope validation evaluates the evolution of eligibility or enforcement state over time based on recorded governance events. Policy-defined criteria determine whether the trust state is stable, improving, or degrading. A stable or improving trust slope may satisfy authorization conditions for specified action classes. A degrading trust slope may restrict eligibility, elevate enforcement class, require corroboration, or trigger quarantine evaluation.
The trust slope is therefore a property of how an agent object's recorded governance history evolves, not a static score and not a separately maintained credential. It is computed from objectively recorded events under criteria supplied by verified policy authority. The terms stable, improving, and degrading describe trust-slope state under explicit policy-defined criteria, not a model's prediction of intent or outcome.
Deterministic, Not Probabilistic
This embodiment applies deterministic, policy-defined evaluation to objectively verifiable records. It does not rely on subjective scoring or probabilistic inference. Because the inputs are objective records and the criteria are supplied by verified policy authority, the determination is reproducible from the same inputs.
Authorization fails under defined conditions: if continuity cannot be established, if audit references cannot be validated, if lineage continuity fails, or if trust-slope thresholds are unmet. In each case instantiation of an execution context or other governed transition is prevented, consistent with the architecture's treatment of non-execution as a valid system outcome.
Relationship to Continuity-Based Verification Elsewhere
Memory-resolved identity and trust-slope validation are the same continuity-based mechanisms referenced throughout the disclosure as alternatives to public-key signature verification. The verification field of a cryptographic policy object may, in some embodiments, comprise continuity-based authentication material validated through memory-resolved identity, trust-slope validation, or lineage continuity mechanisms, enabling authority establishment without persistent static keypairs. Lineage continuity may likewise be validated using continuity-based mechanisms such as memory-resolved identity or trust-slope validation that do not require persistent static keypairs.
This embodiment applies those same continuity-based mechanisms to the establishment of an agent object's authority to act, so that the governance gate can reach a deterministic permit-or-deny outcome where static key-bound identity is unavailable. In all cases the substitution is for the identity and verification basis, while the externally governed policy-object authority model, the precondition gating, and the append-only audit recording remain unchanged.
Disclosure Scope
Governance enforcement without persistent keypairs, comprising an agent object operating without persistent key storage that carries governance-relevant memory of prior authorization outcomes, denials, governance-designated execution feedback, lineage continuity markers, and audit references, a memory-resolved identity evaluation that validates whether that memory and its associated records form a coherent, verifiable continuity chain under an applicable trust model, a trust-slope validation that evaluates whether recorded eligibility or enforcement state is stable, improving, or degrading under policy-defined criteria, and a governance gate that produces a deterministic authorization decision from these evaluations together with externally governed policy objects, is disclosed in U.S. Application No. 19/561,229. The scope includes policy objects defining required continuity depth, acceptable decay rates, remediation prerequisites, audit anchoring frequency, corroboration thresholds, and action-class-specific assurance requirements, and embodiments in which policy requires traditional signatures or hardware-backed attestations for higher-risk action classes while permitting continuity-based authorization for lower-risk classes. The scope further includes recording of execution feedback and enforcement outcomes into governance-relevant memory to update continuity evidence and trust-slope state for future evaluations. The disclosure presents this as an optional embodiment in which the substitution is for static key-bound identity, while the externally governed policy-object authority model, deterministic precondition gating, and non-execution as a valid system outcome are preserved.
