Mechanism
In the governed spatial mesh, a restraining-order or protective-order is not an external alert layered on top of the agent. It is disclosed as a credentialed attribute of the operator hostility profile: a restraining-order or legal-constraint attribute indicating judicial or regulatory restrictions on proximity, contact, or operational contexts. The attribute is supplied by a source class, and judicial authorities are the source class disclosed for restraining-order, protective-order, and legal-constraint attributes.
Each attribute carries the credentialing source's authority credential. The consuming agent evaluates each attribute against the source's authority and track record, so a protective-order constraint binds because it traces to a recognized judicial authority, not because it was asserted by operator preference or inferred from environmental observation. An attribute that does not carry a credentialing source's authority credential is not admitted on the same footing.
Protective-order constraints are subject to governance-policy-defined due-process constraints and to privacy governance that produces stricter tiers than the operator risk profile. The disclosure pairs an operator-consent or statutory-authority verifier with these attributes, reflecting that a legal-constraint attribute may be admitted under statutory authority rather than operator consent.
Operating Parameters
The disclosure does not fix a numeric latency bound, a precedence-class count, or a cryptographic key size for protective-order constraints; those are governance-policy-defined. What it does specify is the governing structure. Hostility-profile signals, including the restraining-order or legal-constraint attribute, are subject to privacy governance and to due-process constraints that produce stricter privacy tiers than the operator risk profile. The disclosed tiers admit a plurality of disclosure levels, including a minimal-disclosure tier revealing only an aggregated hostility class, a proximity-gated tier revealing specific attributes only to consuming agents within governance-policy-defined spatial proximity, a target-proximity tier revealing target-specific attributes only to the identified target's personal agent and to governance-credentialed infrastructure agents in the target's vicinity, and a law-enforcement tier revealing the full profile only to credentialed authorities acting under investigative, protective, or emergency authority.
Each attribute is evaluated against the source's authority and track record. Consuming agents adjust coordination margins, evasive-readiness thresholds, route selection, and response-mode defaults upon admission of hostility-profile signals, and each adjustment is lineage-recorded to support downstream audit of coordination decisions.
Release of a protective-order constraint follows the disclosed credential-revocation phase. A credentialing authority emits a revocation governed observation identifying a specific device, credential, or credential class as no longer authoritative, and consuming devices down-weight or invalidate previously admitted governed mesh messages in accordance with a governance-policy-defined retroactive-effect window that specifies the duration of past emissions subject to the revocation.
Alternative Embodiments
The disclosure admits a plurality of credentialing source classes for hostility-profile attributes. Law-enforcement authorities supply incident-history, conviction-history, and active-investigation attributes; judicial authorities supply restraining-order, protective-order, and legal-constraint attributes; regulatory authorities supply license-suspension and disciplinary-action attributes; security authorities supply protected-class attributes associated with the protected party; and intelligence and defense authorities supply coalition-adversary attributes in coalition or multi-agent contexts.
The legal-constraint attribute itself characterizes judicial or regulatory restrictions on proximity, contact, or operational contexts, so the same primitive accommodates a no-contact or proximity restriction, a contact restriction, and an operational-context restriction without a separate mechanism for each. Target-specific governance is supported: a target-proximity tier reveals target-specific-animosity attributes only to the identified target's personal agent and to governance-credentialed infrastructure agents in the target's vicinity, and the disclosure describes target-protective routing for units that are the identified target of target-specific adversarial intent. Operator self-declaration is also admitted as a source for voluntary disclosure of restricted operating contexts.
Composition
Protective-order integration sits within the operator-intent sharing primitive and the hostility-profile mechanism rather than in a standalone module. The operator-intent primitive composes with the governed mesh protocol through intent-observation emission, with the dispositional field through disposition-weighted intent consumption, with the confidence-governed execution primitive through intent-confidence-governed coordination, with the capability envelope through intent-bounded capability derating, and with the biological identity primitive through operator-state and privacy-tier governance. A protective-order constraint admitted as a hostility-profile attribute therefore reaches coordination, routing, and response-mode decisions through these existing composition points.
The mechanism composes with the credentialing infrastructure: each attribute carries the credentialing source's authority credential, and consuming agents evaluate it against the source's authority and track record. It composes with lineage: each coordination adjustment made on admission of a hostility-profile signal is lineage-recorded, supporting downstream audit of the decisions taken under the constraint. It composes with the credential lifecycle: issuance, rotation, update, and revocation of authority credentials are governed by the disclosed credential lifecycle, and release of a protective-order constraint follows the credential-revocation phase with its governance-policy-defined retroactive-effect window. Privacy governance and due-process constraints apply throughout, producing stricter tiers for hostility-profile attributes than for the operator risk profile.
Prior Art
The disclosure frames protective-order handling as part of mixed-fidelity, governance-credentialed cooperation in a shared physical space, where autonomous, semi-autonomous, and manual units interact with heterogeneous intent-disclosure capability. The distinguishing properties it asserts for the hostility-profile primitive are that each attribute carries its credentialing source's authority credential, that the consuming agent evaluates each attribute against the source's authority and track record, and that hostility-profile signals are governed under stricter due-process privacy tiers than the operator risk profile. The disclosure does not name specific competitor products or prior systems for protective-order enforcement, and no such named comparison is asserted here.
Disclosure Scope
This article describes subject matter disclosed in U.S. Provisional Application No. 64/049,409. The provisional discloses, as an embodiment, the restraining-order or legal-constraint attribute as one of a plurality of operator hostility-profile attributes, supplied by judicial authorities as a credentialing source class for restraining-order, protective-order, and legal-constraint attributes, with each attribute carrying the credentialing source's authority credential and evaluated against the source's authority and track record.
The disclosure governs these attributes under privacy governance and governance-policy-defined due-process constraints that produce stricter privacy tiers than the operator risk profile, with disclosure levels spanning minimal-disclosure, proximity-gated, target-proximity, and law-enforcement tiers. Release of a constraint follows the disclosed credential-revocation phase, in which a credentialing authority emits a revocation governed observation and consuming devices down-weight or invalidate previously admitted messages under a governance-policy-defined retroactive-effect window. Coordination adjustments made on admission of a hostility-profile signal are lineage-recorded to support downstream audit. The specific numeric thresholds, latency bounds, privacy-tier boundaries, and cryptographic schemes are governance-policy-defined and are not fixed by the disclosure.
