Mechanism
The multi-hop mesh relay mechanism propagates a governed mesh message beyond the direct signaling range of the originating device. A governed mesh message carries a hop-count field and a hop-history field. When a relaying device receives a governed mesh message, it first evaluates the message through its own composite admissibility evaluator; a message that is not admissible at the relaying device is not rebroadcast. The relaying device then validates relay authority, confirming that it is authorized by governance policy to relay messages of the authority level encoded in the message's authority-credential field. Only after admission and relay-authority validation does the device proceed to rebroadcast.
On rebroadcast, the relaying device increments the hop-count field and extends the hop-history field. Each relaying device appends to the hop-history field the relaying device's identifier and the relay time, together with the relaying device's authority credential and dynamic device hash. The result is a governance-chain-preserving relay record in which each hop in the relay path is individually attributable and verifiable by downstream consumers. The hop-history field is extended without replacing the originating device's identity or credential, so the originating provenance is preserved alongside the relay provenance.
The mechanism enforces a maximum-hop-count parameter specified by governance policy. A governed mesh message whose hop-count field exceeds the maximum-hop-count parameter is not rebroadcast, which bounds propagation. A duplicate-suppression mechanism at each relaying device detects and suppresses rebroadcast of a governed mesh message that the device previously relayed within a duplicate-suppression window. The deduplication identifier is computed from the originating-device identifier and a message-sequence number, from a cryptographic hash of the governed mesh message body, or from any equivalent deduplication mechanism that identifies two transmissions as representing the same source observation. The duplicate-suppression window is governance-policy-configurable and accommodates both short-window deduplication for suppression of immediate echo and long-window deduplication for suppression of delayed rebroadcast through mobile store-and-forward carriage.
Downstream consumers evaluate the hop-history field for trust-weighted attribution. A governed mesh message that has traversed a plurality of high-authority relaying devices is assigned higher evidential weight than a message that has traversed a plurality of low-authority or unverified relaying devices. Because each hop records the relaying device's authority credential and dynamic device hash, the consuming device can attribute and weight each hop in the relay path rather than receiving only source and destination identifiers.
Operating Parameters
The maximum-hop-count parameter is specified by governance policy. The specification does not fix a numeric depth; the bound is a policy choice that limits how far a governed mesh message propagates. A message whose hop-count field exceeds the configured maximum is not rebroadcast.
The hop-history field records, for each hop, the relaying device's identifier and the relay time together with the relaying device's authority credential and dynamic device hash. The specification does not fix an entry size or a total field size; these follow from the credential and identity encoding chosen for the mesh.
The duplicate-suppression window is governance-policy-configurable. A short window suppresses immediate echo of a just-relayed message, while a long window suppresses delayed rebroadcast that arrives through mobile store-and-forward carriage. The deduplication identifier may be derived from the originating-device identifier and a message-sequence number, from a cryptographic hash of the message body, or from any equivalent mechanism that identifies two transmissions as the same source observation.
Relay authority is itself a governance-policy parameter. Relay scoping makes a governed mesh message of a first authority level relayable only by devices credentialed at or above a policy-defined minimum authority level, preventing unauthorized amplification of governed mesh messages.
Evidential weighting at consuming devices is governance-policy-defined. A message that has traversed high-authority relaying devices is weighted more heavily than one that has traversed low-authority or unverified relaying devices, with the adjustment specified by policy rather than by a fixed numeric rule.
Alternative Embodiments
In the broadcast-relay embodiment that the specification describes, the multi-hop mesh relay operates without route establishment, route maintenance, or route invalidation. The governed mesh message propagates through any available relaying device within signaling range rather than through a pre-established route, and each hop operates in broadcast mode, supporting delivery to any receiving device within signaling range of any relaying device rather than unicast delivery to a specific destination.
In the admissibility-gated embodiment, the relay decision at each hop is evaluated through the composite admissibility evaluator of the relaying device rather than through a routing-table lookup or shortest-path algorithm. A message that is not admissible at a relaying device is not rebroadcast, so admissibility, not reachability, governs propagation.
In a mobile store-and-forward embodiment, an operating unit functions as a mobile carrier of governed observations across regions lacking continuous connectivity between environmental devices. The operating unit stores an admitted governed mesh message in a carrier buffer, moves through a region lacking direct signaling coverage, and re-emits the stored message upon entering a new signaling volume if its time-to-live has not elapsed. A carrier-lineage appendment mechanism adds the carrying operating unit's identifier, carriage interval, and authority credential to the hop-history field of each re-emitted message, preserving the governance chain across the carriage.
In a degraded-relay embodiment, a relaying device whose credential is low-authority or unverified still appends its hop record, and downstream consumers assign the message reduced evidential weight accordingly. Trust-weighted evaluation makes a message that traversed low-authority or unverified relays a weighted input to admissibility rather than a binary accept-or-reject case.
Composition
Multi-hop mesh relay composes with the device authority taxonomy and the dynamic device hash, since each appended hop record carries the relaying device's authority credential and dynamic device hash. The hop history is therefore a governance-chain artifact rather than a bare routing trace, and downstream consumers read it as a trust-weighted provenance record about the relay path.
The mechanism composes with the composite admissibility evaluator at both relaying and consuming devices. At each relaying device, the evaluator gates rebroadcast; at each consuming device, the evaluator takes the hop history into account when deciding whether and how heavily to credit the observation. The relay-authority validation mechanism and the maximum-hop-count parameter are themselves governance-policy configurations, so the relay behavior is shaped by the same policy layer that governs admissibility.
The mechanism composes with mobile store-and-forward carriage, which extends propagation across regions of sparse device deployment by treating operating units as mobile carriers whose trajectories carry governed observations forward. A carried message retains its originating authority credential, originating dynamic device hash, and originating references, with the carrier's identity appended to the hop-history field rather than replacing the originating identity. Consuming devices then weight both the originating provenance and the carriage provenance in a single trust-weighted composite evaluation.
Prior-Art Distinction
The specification distinguishes the multi-hop mesh relay from prior multi-hop routing protocols in four respects. First, the relay decision at each hop is evaluated through the composite admissibility evaluator of the relaying device rather than through a routing-table lookup or shortest-path algorithm. Second, the hop-history field preserves the authority credentials and continuity-based identities of each relaying device, producing an end-to-end trust-weighted provenance record rather than only source and destination identifiers. Third, the relay operates without route establishment, route maintenance, or route invalidation, with the message propagating through any available relaying device within signaling range rather than through a pre-established route. Fourth, the relay operates in broadcast mode at each hop, supporting delivery to any receiving device within signaling range of any relaying device rather than unicast delivery to a specific destination.
The result is an in-band, governance-chain-preserving hop record that a consuming device reads directly, attributing and weighting each hop in the relay path without out-of-band log collection. The disclosure is owned by U.S. Provisional Application No. 64/049,409.
Scope of the Primitive
The disclosure covers a multi-hop mesh relay mechanism in which a governed mesh message carries a hop-count field incremented by each relaying device and a hop-history field extended by each relaying device to record the relaying device's identifier and relay time together with the relaying device's authority credential and dynamic device hash, in which a maximum-hop-count parameter set by governance policy bounds propagation, in which a duplicate-suppression mechanism suppresses rebroadcast within a configurable window, and in which a relay-authority validation mechanism enforces policy-defined relay scoping. The resulting hop history is a governance-chain-preserving, per-hop attributable, trust-weighted provenance record that downstream consumers evaluate through their composite admissibility evaluator.
The disclosure is independent of the specific physical substrate and the specific routing logic. It composes with mobile store-and-forward carriage, in which an operating unit carries an admitted governed mesh message across a region of sparse connectivity and re-emits it with a carrier-lineage appendment that adds the carrier's identifier, carriage interval, and authority credential to the hop-history field, preserving the originating identity rather than replacing it.
The load-bearing properties are the per-hop hop-history extension carrying authority credential and dynamic device hash, the governance-policy maximum-hop-count bound, the duplicate-suppression window, the relay-authority validation, and the trust-weighted evaluation at consuming devices. Compositions that produce only source and destination identifiers, that establish and maintain routes rather than broadcasting at each hop, or that defer relay decisions to a routing-table lookup rather than the composite admissibility evaluator lack one or more of these properties.
Disclosure Scope
This article describes subject matter disclosed in U.S. Provisional Application No. 64/049,409. A provisional application establishes a priority date and is not an issued patent. The scope of any resulting protection is determined by the claims of any later-filed nonprovisional application as ultimately granted. Nothing here should be read as a representation of issued-claim scope.
